

HISTORY OF THE DIRECTORATE OF PLANS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS AND PROGRAMS

[REDACTED] HQ USAF [REDACTED]

VOLUME 22 ~~CH0/TS~~

1 JULY 1961 -- 31 DECEMBER 1961
~~CH0/TS~~

Copy no. 1 of 3 copies. 284 pages
[REDACTED]

AF/CVAH(S) ~~TS~~

80-CVAH(S)-D 152

CPY R-1 OF CPY 1

CH0/TS

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PLANS AND OPERATIONS ON
6 SEPTEMBER 1988

4 hours. The material shows a potential for use in air-sea rescue and sub-limited war operations.

NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SAFETY

In accordance with DOD Directive 5030.15, safety rules for USAF nuclear weapon systems entering the operational inventory during this period were developed and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense for approval. Final approval³⁴ was granted by the Secretary of Defense for the following nuclear weapon system safety rules:

F-100, F-101, F-104/MK-28	1 July 1961
SM-75 (THOR)/MK-2 RV/MK-49	18 July 1961
SM-78 (JUPITER)/MK-49	20 July 1961
SM-68 (TITAN I)/MK-4 RV/MK-38	14 August 1961
TM-76A (MACE A RFML)/MK-28	18 August 1961
SM-65E (ATLAS E)/MK-4 RV/MK-38	9 September 1961
B-58A/BLU-2B/MK-39	22 September 1961
IM-99B (BOMARC B)/MK-40	29 September 1961
Non-US NATO VALIANT/MK-28	14 November 1961

Final approval was also granted on 22 September 1961 for proposed changes to safety rules for strategic offensive systems which will permit combat configuration of weapons after the "GO" code is received and prior to crossing the H-Hour Control Line (HHCL) or descent for low-level penetration, whichever occurs first.

34. JCS 2019 series of papers, on file AFYPD-RA

Final approval of the TF/F-102A/GAR-11/MK-54 Safety Rules is expected after 1 January 1962 in view of informal indications that the AEC and the President have acted favorably on the proposed rules.

The Secretary of Defense granted³⁵ interim approval, pending coordination with the AEC, of safety rules for the following weapon systems on the dates indicated:

B-52/GAM-77A/MK-28	10 August 1961
Non-US NATO F-84F/MK-7	7 October 1961
TM-76B(MACE B)/MK-28	22 December 1961

During this period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved³⁶ proposed changes to USAF Air Defense Safety Rules which will permit implementation of NORAD employment procedures to insure maximum readiness. The modification was required in order that all USAF Air Defense Safety Rules would uniformly state the conditions under which Air Defense forces may be launched or placed in advanced readiness conditions prior to the declaration of a Defense Emergency or Air Defense Emergency.

The JCS also forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, modifications³⁷ to the Air Force proposed safety rules³⁸ for the Non-US NATO F-84F/MK-7 Weapon System which would permit USCINCEUR to authorize use of the 210 capsule in the MK-7 weapon on Quick

35. JCS 2019 series of papers, on file AFXPDP-RA

36. Decision on JCS 2019/691, on file AFXPDP-RA

37. Appendix to JCS 2019/694, on file AFXPDP-RA

38. Appendix to JCS 2019/686, on file AFXPDP-RA

GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF THE SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN
FOR FY 1963 (SIOP-63)

[REDACTED] The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to resolve divergent views on what guidance should be provided to the Director, Strategic Target Planning for preparation of SIOP-63. The Army, Navy and Marine Corps reached a common agreement on the guidance and they were supported by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Air Force opposed the majority view.

[REDACTED] In essence, the majority view would have had SIOP-63 programmed against a relatively small number of targets, attacked with relatively few strategic forces, with low expectancies of success. For example they would not have included on the target list any industrial target not located in a major urban center; they would not have included any military targets other than those posing a nuclear threat to the U. S.; they would have attacked only 50 soft missile sites and only the soft elements of nuclear delivery airfields.

[REDACTED] The divergent views were forwarded⁶⁰ to the Secretary of Defense on 1 September 1961. He then provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff with his view of what the guidance should be. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with minor revisions promulgated⁶¹ the guidance for preparation of SIOP-63 on 27 October 1961.

60. JCS 2056/279

61. JCS 2056/285

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The guidance promulgated agreed essentially with the Air Force position forwarded to the Secretary. In addition the guidance reflected the current administration strategic concept of providing a broad spectrum of attack options which the President may elect to execute in a careful, deliberate, controlled attack, presumably allowing for pauses to negotiate with the enemy for terms on which to end the war under conditions most advantageous to the United States. SIOP-63 will be effective on about 1 August 1962.

[REDACTED]

AEROSPACE POLICY DIVISION

GENERAL

[REDACTED] During this period, 1 July 61 through 31 December 61, the Division responsible for Arms Control underwent changes among which was the name change to Aerospace Policy Division. The functions of Arms Control did not change appreciably; however, there was a move to different offices which allowed all Arms Control Personnel to occupy adjacent offices.

NATO NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS STATUS

[REDACTED] A 144B agreement was signed for French forces in Germany on 9 October 61. The Belgium 144B agreement, which will complete the three required agreements, is nearing completion and is expected to be signed within a month.

CHANGES IN U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY WITH NATO ALLIES

[REDACTED] The Holifield Report, AEC, and DOD questioned the advisability of providing thermonuclear (TN) weapons of sensitive design to NATO Allies because of possible clandestine radiography or the incomplete emergency destruction of weapons.¹¹² The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that no further TN weapons be transferred until the problems were resolved.¹¹³ On 19 October 1961, the President

¹¹². JCS 2019/709, 14 Dec 61

¹¹³. JCS 1438, 3 Sept 61; USCINCEUR ALO 832, 22 Sep 61

[REDACTED]

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authorized the transfer of MK-28-Y4's, a non-TN weapon but suitable for current aircraft release systems, to Turkey. It appears that French forces in Germany, as well as other allies, will probably receive MK-28-Y4's, MK-43-Y4's, and/or MK-57's. W-49 warheads for Jupiter missiles in Turkey, an exception to the above policy, were released for Turkey because U.S. forces had complete custody and control. Actual transfer of 28-Y4's has been held up ¹¹⁴ pending Turkish cooperation in establishment of U.S. tropospheric scatter communications facilities in Turkey.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

[REDACTED] Arms Control has actioned several papers on ¹¹⁵ Command and Control, and it appears that the problem will receive increased future emphasis. Principally, the issues confront improved communications and "permissive links" for nuclear weapon control. At year end, AEC, DASA and services were studying "permissive link" ¹¹⁶ feasibility.

NUCLEAR TESTING

[REDACTED] For some time USAF has been pressing for

114. State Department msgs TOPOL 774, 24 Nov 61; 2902, 18 Nov 61; 2915, 20 Nov 61

115. JCS 2019/659

116. MLC memo to AEC and CDASA, 14 Mar 61
JCS 2019/703